The effects of mergers: an international comparison by Gugler, Klaus et al.
www.ssoar.info
The effects of mergers: an international comparison
Gugler, Klaus; Mueller, Dennis C.; Yurtoglu, B. Burcin; Zulehner, Christine
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Gugler, K., Mueller, D. C., Yurtoglu, B. B., & Zulehner, C. (2001). The effects of mergers: an international comparison.
(Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische
Ökonomie, 01-21). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-110205
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 discussion papers 
 
 
 
ISSN Nr. 0722 - 6748 
 
 Forschungsschwerpunkt 
 Markt und politische Ökonomie  
   
 Research Area 
 Markets and Political Economy 
 
FS IV 01  21  
The Effects of Mergers:  An International 
Comparison 
 
 
Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, 
B. Burcin Yurtoglu, and Christine Zulehner 
    
University of Vienna 
 
 
         
          
November 2001 
 
 ii 
Zitierweise/Citation: 
 
Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, B. Burcin Yurtoglu, and 
Christine Zulehner, The Effects of Mergers:  An 
International Comparison, Discussion Paper FS IV 01-21, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2001. 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH, 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Tel. (030) 2 54 91  0 
Internet: www.wz-berlin.de 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Mergers:  An International Comparison 
by Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller, B. Burcin Yurtoglu, and Christine Zulehner* 
This paper analyzes the effects of mergers around the world over the past 15 years. We 
utilize a large panel of data on mergers to test several hypotheses about mergers. The 
effects of the mergers are examined by comparing the performance of the merging firms 
with control groups of nonmerging firms. The comparisons are made on profitability 
and sales. The results show that mergers on average do result in significant increases in 
profits, but reduce the sales of the merging firms. Interestingly, these post merger 
patterns look similar across countries. We also did not find dramatic differences 
between mergers in the manufacturing and the service sectors, and between domestic 
and cross-border mergers. Conglomerate mergers decrease sales more than horizontal 
mergers. By separating mergers into those that increase profits and those that reduce 
them and by then examining the patterns of sales changes following the mergers, we 
determine the effects of mergers on efficiency and market power. Our results suggest 
that those mergers that decrease profits and efficiency account for a large proportion. 
However, we can also identify mergers that increase profits by either increasing market 
power or by increasing efficiency. The first conclusion seems to be a more likely 
explanation for large companies, whereas the latter is likely to be true for small firms. 
 
Keywords: Mergers, Acquisitions, International Comparison 
JEL Classification: G34, L2 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Effekte von Fusionen: Ein internationaler Vergleich 
Dieser Artikel analysiert die Effekte von Fusionen, die weltweit über die letzten 15 
Jahre stattgefunden haben. Wir vergleichen die Gewinn- und Umsatzentwicklung von 
fusionierenden Firmen mit der Entwicklung von nicht-fusionierenden Firmen. Die 
Resultate zeigen, dass Fusionen im Durchschnitt zu signifikant höheren Profiten führen, 
aber dass die Umsätze im Vergleich zur Kontrollgruppe zurückbleiben. 
Interessanterweise sind diese Effekte bei Vergleichen zwischen den verschiedenen 
Ländern, bei einem Vergleich zwischen Industriesektor und Dienstleistungssektor bzw. 
zwischen nationalen und grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen ziemlich ähnlich.  
Konglomerate Fusionen reduzieren die Umsätze mehr als horizontale Fusionen. Um die 
Effekte der Fusionen auf die Marktmacht bzw. die Effizienz zu analysieren, teilen wir 
zuerst die Fusionen in gewinnsteigernde und gewinnreduzierende Fusionen, um dann 
die Umsatzentwicklung zu betrachten. Unsere Resultate zeigen, dass ein großer 
Prozentsatz der Fusionen die Gewinne und die Effizienz reduzieren. Wir können jedoch 
auch Fusionen identifizieren, die die Gewinne entweder durch Marktmacht- oder 
Effizienzsteigerungen erhöhen.  Die erste Erklärung ist wahrscheinlicher für große 
Firmen, die zweite für kleine Firmen.  
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The past century saw five great merger waves  one at its beginning, and successive waves at the 
ends of the 20s, 60s, 80s and 90s.  While much of the earlier merger activity was confined to North 
America and Great Britain, the most recent wave has engulfed all of the major industrial countries of the 
world.  And, as befits a global economy, it has been composed of an increasing percentage of cross-
border acquisitions.  What have been the causes of these great bursts of merger activity?  What have been 
their effects?  In this paper we focus largely on the second question, but the answers that we give to it will 
also shed light on the first.  We confine our analysis to mergers taking place in the last two decades, but 
include in it mergers from around the world including also cross-border acquisitions. 
The hypotheses as to why mergers1 occur can be grouped into three broad categories.  Of these, 
the first two presume that the managers of the merging companies seek to maximize profits or 
shareholder wealth.  Under this assumption any merger must be expected to either increase the market 
power of the merging companies or reduce their costs.  The third set of hypotheses includes those that 
posit other managerial goals than profits, as say the growth of the firm, or quasi-irrational behavior as 
might occur because managers are overcome by hubris. 
From the point of view of the theory of the firm, it is important to determine whether mergers are 
best explained by one of the hypotheses from the third category, or by a hypothesis that presumes profits 
maximization.  If all mergers are consistent with profits maximization, then corporate governance 
structures can be assumed to be designed in such a way as to align shareholder and managerial interests.  
If, on the other hand, a large fraction does not appear to increase shareholder wealth, corporate 
governance structures must be assumed to be deficient in bringing about such an alignment. We attempt 
to determine whether mergers increase market power or efficiency by examining their impacts on 
company sales and profits.  In this way, we seek to determine to what extent mergers fall into each of 
these three categories. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the following section we describe the methodology used to 
determine the effects of mergers.  Our data base is described in section II.  Sections III and IV present our 
overall findings and those that are specific to the question of whether mergers increase efficiency or 
market power.  In section V we compare our findings with those previously reported in the literature.  The 
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sample is divided according to the mergers' effects on market power and efficiency in section VI.   
Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
I.  Methodology  
 A. A Categorization of the Effects of Mergers 
It is reasonable to assume that all firms possess some market power.  Even a company selling 
what appears to be a homogeneous product generally has some power to set price due to locational 
advantages, a reputation for reliability or good service, and so on.  Thus, we shall assume that all firms 
face negative sloped demand schedules.  The first-order condition for profits maximization then implies 
that firm i chooses a price pi that satisfies the following condition 
 i i
i i
p c
p
−
=
1
η
  (1) 
where ci is the firms marginal costs and ηi is its elasticity of demand.  Equation (1) is of course the 
familiar Lerner condition for profits maximization for a monopoly except that the firms demand 
elasticity replaces the industry elasticity.  The firms demand elasticity takes into account the conjectured 
responses of its rivals to any change in price it might make.   
A merger, which increases the market power of a firm, must do so by either increasing the degree 
of collusion among the firms in the industry or by increasing its market share.  Either way the firms 
demand elasticity, ηi, falls and it raises its price.  If ci > 0, (1) implies that ηi >1, and thus that is sales fall 
when it raises its price.  We thus predict for mergers that increase market power increases in profits and 
declines in sales (see cell 2 in Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Possible Consequences of Mergers 
 
 ∆Π > 0  ∆Π < 0  
∆ S > 0 
1 
Efficiency Increase 
 
3 
Market Power Reduction (?) 
∆ S < 0 2 Market Power Increase 
4 
Efficiency Decline 
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A merger, which increases efficiency leaves ηi, unchanged, but lowers ci.  The profits 
maximizing price falls and sales expand.  We thus predict for mergers that increase efficiency increases in 
both profits and sales (cell 1 in Table 1). 
Although these strike us as the most plausible predictions to make about market power and 
efficiency enhancing mergers, the variety of assumptions that one can make about the characteristics of 
cost functions and oligopolistic interactions is so large that it is probably possible to construct an example 
in which any one of the four possible combinations of profits and sales changes in Table 1 follows a 
merger that increases either efficiency or market power.  For example, with an initial situation in which n 
firms are in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, if marginal costs are sufficiently low so that the 
equilibrium is in the inelastic portion of the demand schedule, a merger which both reduced the number 
of firms and led to perfect collusion among them might increase both the profits and the sales of the 
merging firms.2 
A more plausible possibility would be a merger, which increased efficiency by reducing fixed 
costs, but left marginal costs unchanged.  Profits would then rise, but sales would remain unchanged.  Of 
course, in the long run all costs are variable, and thus we would expect that a merger that reduced fixed 
costs would eventually lead to lower prices and increased sales.  But we shall only measure the effects of 
mergers for up to five years after they occur, and five years are arguably too short of a time interval to see 
increases in sales for a merger that reduces fixed costs.  Thus, it is possible that a merger, which only 
reduced fixed costs, would increase profits without increasing sales. 
Mergers that reduce efficiency should reduce both profits and sales (cell 4).  Such mergers might 
take place either because profit-maximizing managers make mistakes, or because they pursue other goals 
than profits, like growth. 
The most puzzling entry in Table 1 appears in cell 3.  Profits decline, but sales increase.  Since 
this outcome is the mirror image of cell 2, we have labelled it Market Power Reduction, but the 
question mark indicates our uncomfortableness with this categorization.  No profit-maximizing manager 
would undertake a merger because she wanted to increase the amount of competition her firm faces.  
Sales increases coupled with profit declines might be observed, if the managers were sales or growth 
maximizers.  Thus, both cells 3 and 4 could contain mergers motivated by the pursuit of growth.  
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Nevertheless, both the motivation behind and the consequences of mergers falling into cell 3 are more 
difficult to identify than for the other three cells. 
We think that the categorization of mergers in Table 1 is reasonable and helpful when making 
normative judgments about the consequences of mergers.  But the reader is of course free to make his or 
her own categorization.  Our main goal in this paper is simply to report what the effects of mergers on the 
profits and sales of the merging firms have been.  We turn now to a description of the procedures used to 
make this determination. 
 
B. Measuring the Effects of Mergers 
To measure the effects of mergers on sales and profits properly, we need to control for general 
changes in the economy that might affect the merging companies performance.  Previous studies have 
employed industry means, size matched non-merging firms and the median firm from a merging firm's 
industry.3  We match each merging company to the median firm in its industry, and thus assume that the 
merging companies' profits and sales would have changed in the same way that the median firms profits 
and sales in their respective industries changed. 4 
Consider first the problem of predicting the merging companies sales.  Define: 
SGt+n as the sales of the acquiring company in year t+n, 
SDt as the sales of the acquired company in year t, 
SCt+n as the predicted sales of the combined company in year t+n, 
SIGt+n as the sales of the median firm in the industry of the acquiring company in year t+n, and  
SIDt+n as the sales of the median firm in the industry of the acquired company in year t+n. 
The predicted sales for the combined company in year t+n is estimated as follows: 
 C t n G t
IG t n
IG t
D t
ID t n
ID t
S S
S
S
S
S
S+ −
+
−
+
= +1
1
  (2) 
The sales of the acquiring company are projected relative to its sales in the year prior to the 
merger, the sales of the acquired company are projected relative to its sales in the year of the merger. 
It often happens, of course, that companies make several acquisitions over short spans of time.  
To allow for this possibility we amend Eq. 2 to take into account mergers occurring after time t.  If, for 
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example, a firm made one acquisition in t and another in t+2, then the amended formula for predicting 
SCt+n would look like the following (for n ≥ 2) 
 C t n G t
IG t n
IG t
D t
ID t n
ID t
D t
ID t n
ID t
S S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S+ −
+
−
+
+
+
+
= + +1
1
2
2
 (3) 
Many firms both acquire and sell assets.  We also need to account for the effects of spin- and sell-
offs on the merging companies sales.  We do so by treating these sales symmetrically to acquisitions.  
Namely, we subtract the sales of any part of a company sold or spun-off during the five years after a 
merger, again scaling the sales of the spun-off unit by the changes in sales for the median firm in its 
industry. 
If, for example, a firm made one acquisition in year t, another in year t+2 and spins or sells off a 
company in year t+3, the final formula for predicting SCt+n would then be (for n ≥ 3) 
 Ct n G t
IG t n
IG t
Dt
ID t n
ID t
D t
ID t n
ID t
S t
IS t n
IS t
S S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S+ −
+
−
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
= + + −1
1
2
2
3
3
 (4) 
where SS t+3 denotes the sales spun or sold off by the acquiring company in year t+3 and SIS t+n is the sales 
of the median firm in the industry of the divested company in year t+n.5 
Our methodology for determining the effects of mergers on sales is to compare the predicted 
value for the merged companys sales in year t+n after adjusting for all mergers and spin-offs as obtained 
using Eq. 4, with the actual level of sales of this company. 
Projecting the levels of profits is a little more difficult, because they can take on negative and 
zero values.  Taking ratios of profits at different points in time may introduce significant errors.  We shall, 
therefore, use changes in the ratios of profits to total assets to predict changes in the  profits of the 
merging companies.  Define: 
ΠGt+n as the profits of the acquiring company in year t+n, 
ΠDt as the profits of the acquired company in year t, 
ΠCt+n as the predicted profits of the combined company in year t+n, 
ΠIGt+n as the profits of the median firm in the industry of the acquiring company in year t+n,  
ΠIDt+n as the profits of the median firm in the industry of the acquired company in year t+n. 
KGt+n as the assets of the acquiring company in year t+n, 
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KDt as the assets of the acquired company in year t, 
KIGt+n as the assets of the median firm in the industry of the acquiring company in year t+n, and  
KIDt+n as the assets of the median firm in the industry of the acquired company in year t+n. 
We can now compute the projected change in the returns on the acquirers assets from year t-1 to 
t+n using again the changes observed for the median (in terms of profitability) company in its industry.  
Call this projected change ∆IG t-1,t+n.  
 IG t t n
IG t n
IG t n
IG t
IG tK K
− +
+
+
−
−
= −1
1
1
,∆
Π Π
  (5) 
If the median firm in the acquirers industry earned a .10 return on assets in t-1, and a .11 return 
in t+n, then we would predict that the acquiring firms returns on assets would increase by .01.   
Defining ∆ID t,t+n for the acquired firms industry analogously to ∆IG t-1,t+n gives us the following 
formula for predicting the profits of the combined company in year t+n. 
 C t n G t
IG t n
IG t
G t IG t t n D t
ID t n
ID t
D t ID t t n
K
K
K
K
K
K+ −
+
−
− − +
+
+= + + +Π Π ∆ Π ∆1
1
1 1, ,  (6) 
The profits of the combined company in year t+n are predicted to be the profits of the acquirer in 
t-1, plus the predicted growth in its profits from t-1 to t+n, plus the profits of the acquired firm in t, plus 
the predicted growth in its profits from t to t+n.  Eq. 6 can be modified to take into account additional 
acquisitions and spin-offs in the same way that Eq. 2 was. Thus, if we take the same example from above 
where a firm made one acquisition in year t, another in year t+2 and spins or splits off a company in year 
t+3, the final formula for predicting ΠCt+n is then (for n ≥ 3) 
 
C t n G t
IG t n
IG t
G t IG t t n Dt
ID t n
ID t
D t IDt t n
Dt
ID t n
ID t
D t ID t t n S t
IS t n
IS t
S t IS t t n
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
+ −
+
−
− − +
+
+
+
+
+
+ + + +
+
+
+ + +
= + + + +
+ + − −
Π Π ∆ Π ∆
Π ∆ Π ∆
1
1
1 1
2
2
2 2 3
3
3 3
, ,
, ,
 (7) 
where ΠS t+3 are the profits spun or sold off in year t+3, KIS t+n are the assets of the median firm in the 
industry of the spun- or sold-off company in year t+n, KS t+3 are the assets of the spun- or sold-off 
company in year t+3, and ∆IS t+3,t+n is the projected change in the returns on the spun- or sold-off 
company's assets from year t+3 to t+n.6. 
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II.  Data Description 
Our principal source of data is the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database of Thompson 
Financial Securities Data (TFSD). This company collects merger and spin-off data using a variety of 
sources such as financial newspapers, Reuters Textline, the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones etc. The 
database covers all transactions valued at US $ 1 million or more. We define a merger as a transaction 
where more than 50 percent of the equity of a target firm is acquired.7 During the period 1981 to 1998, 
there were 69,605 announcements of such mergers. Our data for the United States begin in the late 1970s, 
for all other countries in the mid-eighties.  Figure 1 presents the total number of deals by completion year. 
 
Figure 1. The Number of Completed Mergers and Divestitures, 1981-1998 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Mergers D ivestitures  
     Source: SDC Thompson Financial Securities 
 
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of completed mergers. From the nearly 70,000 
announced mergers across the world, nearly 45,000 mergers were actually completed with almost half of 
these taking place in the United States. For the full sample, horizontal mergers make up 42 percent of all 
mergers, conglomerate mergers 54 percent and vertical mergers only 4 percent.  To be defined as a 
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vertical merger at least 10 percent of the sales (purchases) of the primary 4-digit industry to which one of 
the merging companies belongs must go to (come from) the industry to which the other belongs. We use 
the 1992 input-output table for the U.S. economy to make this determination.  Horizontal mergers are 
defined as mergers between two companies with sales in the same primary 4-digit industry.  
Conglomerate mergers consist of all mergers, which are neither horizontal nor vertical.  It is interesting to 
note that a greater fraction of mergers in the United States appears to be horizontal than for any other 
area/country category.  Despite the step-up in antitrust enforcement under the Clinton Administration, a 
greater fraction of mergers between 1993 and 1998 was horizontal in nature than from before 1990.  In 
some years the proportion is nearly 50 percent. Roughly one fifth of the mergers are cross-border 
transactions (22 percent). This number increased from 16 percent before 1990 to 25 percent in the years 
1997/1998. In the USA, this percentage rose from just 3 percent before 1990 to 17 percent in the years 
1997/1998. Cross-border mergers are particularly important in Western Europe (33 percent) and Japan 
(53 percent). To arrive at comparable real values, we first convert all variables to USD and deflate by the 
US-Consumer Price Index with base year 1995. Thus, the average deal value was 220 million 1995-
USD.8 
The samples used for our analysis are much smaller than the numbers in Table 2 suggest due to 
missing data for relevant variables. Acquiring company balance sheet and market data for the years t-1 to 
t+5 relative to the merger year t stem from the Global Vantage/Compustat database. Out of the 45,000 
completed mergers of Table 2 we could match 17,863 to one of these databases. Some acquiring 
companies acquire more than one target in a given year, and since our balance sheet information for 
acquiring companies is on a yearly basis, we aggregate the relevant variables of these targets. This further 
reduces the merger sample to 14,269 merger years.9 
On average, acquiring firms are present over a time period of 15 years in our databases. During 
this period acquiring firms make 2.25 acquisitions and divest 0.83 companies on average.  Missing data 
and the elimination of outliers (we drop the left and right one percent tail of the distribution) reduces the 
sample to the numbers reported in Table 3.10 We have attempted to make our samples as large as possible 
and thus do not limit ourselves to balanced panels, companies making only one merger or the like. 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Summary statistics on mergers and acquisitions from around the world from 1981 to 1998 
Period:  until 1990 1991/92 1993/94 1995/96 1997/98 Whole period 
 United States of America 
Number of deals 8,194 1,965 2,840 3,782 4,367 21,148 
Average deal value (Mn $) 238.2 102.8 137.6 217.0 408.7 246.7 
Cross border 3.4% 11.7% 13.9% 16.0% 16.7% 10.6% 
Horizontal 39.6% 47.4% 48.7% 49.3% 48.9% 45.2% 
Vertical 5.8% 4.9% 3.8% 2.8% 2.8% 4.3% 
Conglomerate 54.6% 47.7% 47.5% 47.9% 48.3% 50.5% 
 United Kingdom 
Number of deals 1,180 501 790 1,138 1,108 4,717 
Average deal value (Mn $) 217.3 113.1 60.6 135.0 212.1 158.3 
Cross border 35.0% 30.3% 26.8% 27.4% 29.0% 29.9% 
Horizontal 31.6% 35.9% 34.7% 37.8% 41.2% 36.3% 
Vertical 4.7% 5.0% 3.5% 4.3% 3.6% 4.2% 
Conglomerate 63.7% 59.1% 61.8% 57.9% 55.2% 59.5% 
 Continental Europe 
Number of deals 986 2,125 1,996 2,359 2,129 9,595 
Average deal value (Mn $) 393.4 186.1 159.2 220.4 414.1 285.9 
Cross border 53.8% 24.2% 26.6% 33.3% 39.8% 33.5% 
Horizontal 37.0% 43.8% 37.5% 35.8% 39.6% 38.9% 
Vertical 4.8% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 
Conglomerate 58.2% 52.7% 59.2% 61.0% 57.0% 57.6% 
 Japan 
Number of deals 172 88 61 151 174 646 
Average deal value (Mn $) 513.2 456.0 198.1 783.3 169.4 464.9 
Cross border 80.8% 72.4% 59.0% 34.4% 28.2% 52.6% 
Horizontal 33.7% 29.5% 36.1% 35.1% 42.0% 35.9% 
Vertical 4.7% 0.0% 3.2% 2.0% 4.0% 3.1% 
Conglomerate 61.6% 70.5% 60.7% 62.9% 54.0% 61.0% 
 Australia / New Zealand / Canada 
Number of deals 671 425 549 766 821 3,232 
Average deal value (Mn $) 354.6 68.5 61.6 118.8 142.5 156.0 
Cross border 37.9% 22.6% 32.4% 27.7% 27.9% 30.0% 
Horizontal 43.8% 43.3% 47.5% 40.1% 44.6% 43.7% 
Vertical 4.8% 1.9% 3.7% 3.1% 3.4% 3.5% 
Conglomerate 51.4% 54.8% 48.8% 56.8% 52.0% 52.8% 
 Rest of the World 
Number of deals 371 553 831 1,728 1,779 5,262 
Average deal value (Mn $) 276.2 150.0 87.5 101.9 143.3 128.3 
Cross border 49.6% 25.7% 32.8% 25.0% 26.5% 28.5% 
Horizontal 34.8% 36.2% 34.7% 36.7% 40.1% 37.3% 
Vertical 6.4% 4.3% 2.7% 3.2% 3.5% 3.6% 
Conglomerate 58.8% 59.5% 62.6% 60.1% 56.4% 59.1% 
 All Mergers 
Number of deals 11,574 5,657 7,067 9,924 10,378 44,600 
Average deal value (Mn $) 256.5 129.3 114.7 181.9 313.4 220.0 
Cross border 15.5% 21.2% 23.0% 24.2% 25.5% 21.7% 
Horizontal 38.6% 43.4% 42.1% 41.7% 44.2% 41.7% 
Vertical 5.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.1% 3.2% 4.0% 
Conglomerate 55.9% 52.6% 54.4% 55.2% 52.6% 54.3% 
Notes: The database is the Global Mergers and Acquisition database of Thompson Financial Securities.  It covers all transactions with a value of 
at least US $ 1 million. Continental Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Switzerland and Island. The Rest of the World sample includes more than 100 other 
countries. Deal value is defined as the total consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees and expenses. The dollar value (deflated by the US-
CPI with base year 1995) includes the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, 
warrants and stake purchases made within six months of the announcement date of the transaction. Liabilities assumed are included in the value if 
they are publicly disclosed. If a portion of the consideration paid by the acquirer is common stock, the stock is valued using the closing price on 
the last full trading day prior to the announcement of the terms of the stock swap. Cross border mergers are mergers where the acquiring and 
acquired companies stem from different nations.  Horizontal mergers are defined as mergers between two companies with sales in the same 
primary 4-digit SIC industry. Vertical mergers are mergers where at least 10% of the sales (purchases) of the primary 4-digit industry, to which 
one of the companies belongs, must go to (come from) the industry to which the other belongs. We use the 1992 US input-output table. 
Conglomerate mergers consist of all mergers, which are neither horizontal nor vertical. 
 10
Panel B of Table 2 presents means of the distributions of sales, profits and profit to assets ratios 
for the acquired and acquiring companies in our sample. Profits are measured before interest and taxes 
(COMPUSTAT item 18), net sales are item 12, and total assets are item 6. Again all variables are deflated 
by the Consumer Price Index with base year 1995. 
 
Table 2  
 
Panel B. Characteristics of Acquiring and Target Companies 
 
 Sales Profits Profit rate 
Number       
of Obs. Acquirer Target Acquirer Target Acquirer Target 
 Mn $ Mn $ Mn $ Mn $   
        
United States of America 1,967 1,997.5 318.0 102.26 9.78 0.029 0.019 
United Kingdom 379 2,162.1 329.7 110.53 10.89 0.066 0.039 
Continental Europe 172 4,644.2 729.6 169.86 24.58 0.035 0.033 
Japan 16 4,349.1 876.1 165.10 26.47 0.011 0.030 
Australia/N.Zealand/Canada 172 1,940.8 391.9 93.45 15.53 0.024 0.027 
Rest of the World 47 2,132.4 443.0 157.64 22.88 0.052 0.013 
       
All mergers 2,753 2,198.0 355.3 108.25 11.53 0.034 0.023 
Note: The sample includes those mergers where we have all the relevant data for year t.  Sales are average sales in 
million 1995 USD, profits are average profits before interest and taxes in million 1995 USD. The profit rate is 
profits before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
 
On average the acquired companies are just 16 percent of the size of the companies, which buy 
them and make only around a tenth of the profits.  In the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Continental Europe the acquired firms are less profitable than their buyers, in Japan, Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand they are more profitable.  In the rest-of-the-world subsample, the acquired companies 
are much less profitable than their buyers.11 
 
III.  Overall Results  
A. Full Sample 
In this section we present the main results for our full sample and for different subsets of mergers 
to see whether mergers on average have increased profits and sales or reduced them.  In the following 
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section we look more closely at the mergers that have increased profitability to see whether the changes 
appear to be due to increases in efficiency or market power. 
 
 
Table 3  
 
Panel A:  Effects of mergers for full sample      
        
Years after Number of Profits Sales 
the merger Observations Difference p-value % Positive Difference p-value % Positive 
  in Mn $   in Mn $   
        
t+1 2,704 5.91 0.062 57.0% -214.16 0.000 51.5% 
t+2 2,274 11.11 0.009 57.2% -382.81 0.000 49.5% 
t+3 1,827 10.79 0.056 54.8% -549.59 0.000 46.4% 
t+4 1,517 19.68 0.007 57.8% -633.46 0.000 46.3% 
t+5 1,250 17.81 0.046 57.6% -714.04 0.000 44.6% 
 
 
 
Panel A of Table 3 presents our findings for the full sample of companies.  The size of the sample 
declines as we move away from the date of the merger because companies disappear from the data set.12 
The profitability numbers consist of the difference in year t+n between the actual profits of the combined 
firm and its projected profits in this year.  Thus a negative number implies a decline in profits. The mean 
difference between actual and projected profitability is positive in all five years after the mergers, and is 
significant in every year at the 10 percent level, or better. The $17.8 million constitutes a difference 
between actual and projected profits of 8.2 (0.20) percent of the profits (assets) of the average acquirer in 
the sample in year t+5. 
The results for sales are again the difference between the actual and projected values for the 
combined companies.  The mean difference in sales is negative in every year and continuously increases 
in absolute value through year 5.  Five years after the mergers, the average acquiring firm had sales that 
were $714 million lower than their projected value.  This constitutes a difference between actual and 
projected sales of 14.5 percent of the sales of the average acquirer in the sample in year t+5.   The last 
column in each set of results gives the fraction of the sample for which the change was positive.  While a 
majority of mergers led to higher actual profits than those predicted, the reverse was true for sales. 
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B. Results by Country 
Panel B reports the comparable figures by country or country group.  The United States makes up 
a substantial fraction of the overall sample and so it is not surprising to find the pattern of results for it 
resembling that of the full sample as just discussed.  Profits are higher than predicted in every post-
merger year, although only three of the five differences are significant at the 10 percent level for the US. 
Actual sales are significantly less than predicted in every post-merger year. In percentage terms we 
predict that mergers increase profits by 8.1% (0.17%) of the profits (assets) of the average acquirer in the 
USA and decrease sales by 14.8% five years after the merger. 
Essentially the same pattern can also be observed for the United Kingdom.  Actual profits are 
greater than projected profits in all five years, although the difference is statistically significant in only the 
first post-merger year.  Actual sales fall short of their projected values in all 5 years after the mergers, 
with all of the declines significant at conventional levels. 
The pattern of results for Continental Europe is very similar to that for the USA and UK.  The 
differences between actual and projected profitability are all positive, but the only significant difference is 
for the fourth post-merger year.  Sales fall short of their projected values in every year and four of the five 
differences are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
The results for Japan are somewhat different than those already discussed.  Three of the five 
profit comparisons are negative, while sales are greater than predicted for the first time in two of the five 
post-merger years.  Our sample for Japan is quite small, however, and none of the differences is 
statistically significant. 
The results for Australia, New Zealand and Canada resemble those for the US, UK and 
Continental Europe in so far as actual sales fall short of predicted sales in all five post-merger years with 
three of the short falls being significant at the 10 percent level or better. The post-merger profit 
differences are also generally insignificant, as was the case for the UK and Western Europe, although in 
the case of Australia, New Zealand and Canada the post-merger profits of the merging firms tend to be 
less than those predicted for them, and one of these differences is significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 3 
 
Panel B. Effects of mergers by country/country groupings 
    
Years after the merger Number of Profits Sales 
 Observations Difference p-value % Positive Difference p-value % Positive 
  in Mn $   in Mn $   
United States of America       
t+1 1,950 3.735 0.307 57.0% -174.495 0.000 52.8% 
t+2 1,641 12.457 0.013 58.1% -324.825 0.000 49.8% 
t+3 1,272 10.490 0.133 55.6% -524.798 0.000 46.6% 
t+4 1,067 16.654 0.054 57.9% -595.367 0.000 45.5% 
t+5 889 17.388 0.098 58.7% -730.236 0.000 44.3% 
        
United Kingdom        
t+1 362 15.440 0.061 65.7% -263.828 0.001 48.6% 
t+2 322 14.902 0.135 59.3% -445.977 0.000 48.9% 
t+3 297 12.545 0.287 52.2% -468.442 0.002 45.4% 
t+4 233 4.729 0.777 55.8% -380.410 0.050 47.0% 
t+5 181 24.149 0.201 53.6% -545.682 0.043 43.5% 
        
Continental Europe        
t+1 178 18.831 0.233 53.9% -568.403 0.001 47.3% 
t+2 140 16.015 0.462 55.7% -1106.104 0.000 46.2% 
t+3 122 19.191 0.457 53.3% -972.056 0.006 47.9% 
t+4 108 81.284 0.016 60.2% -1461.227 0.002 48.5% 
t+5 87 42.345 0.361 58.6% -666.390 0.272 54.2% 
        
Japan        
t+1 20 -36.826 0.342 35.0% -238.893 0.652 61.1% 
t+2 19 -63.507 0.276 21.1% 378.774 0.474 56.3% 
t+3 19 18.149 0.660 42.1% 396.802 0.284 52.9% 
t+4 16 4.031 0.934 43.8% -70.744 0.900 56.3% 
t+5 15 -41.621 0.740 73.3% -2328.611 0.187 46.2% 
        
Australia/New Zealand/Canada       
t+1 165 -3.275 0.801 45.5% -175.353 0.130 47.9% 
t+2 129 -27.001 0.093 45.6% -357.068 0.087 51.2% 
t+3 101 -9.984 0.640 55.4% -686.854 0.014 44.6% 
t+4 79 5.862 0.858 54.3% -962.244 0.016 48.1% 
t+5 66 -33.577 0.308 47.0% -805.393 0.121 39.4% 
        
Rest of the world        
t+1 42 26.539 0.296 51.2% -346.740 0.106 45.2% 
t+2 35 71.808 0.086 61.8% -237.196 0.174 42.9% 
t+3 25 44.931 0.377 65.2% -880.127 0.018 40.0% 
t+4 22 93.866 0.153 89.5% -577.552 0.223 50.0% 
t+5 15 115.937 0.250 64.3% -281.547 0.390 46.7% 
Note: "Difference in Mn $" is the difference between actual and projected profits or sales as obtained by equations 
(4) and (7) in 1995 million USD. A positive number therefore implies that the merger increased profits or sales, a 
negative number implies that the merger decreased profits or sales. "P-value" is the probability that the observed 
differences are zero (2-sided test). "% Positive" is the percentage of positive differences between actual and 
projected values. 
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The pattern of results for the remaining countries also resembles that for the US, UK and 
Continental Europe.  Profit differences are positive in all five years, but are usually insignificantly 
different from zero.  Sales differences are again consistently negative, although only one of these is 
statistically significant  
Thus, the results by country and country group tend to resemble one another by and large.  
Differences between actual and projected profits tend to be positive but often are not significantly 
different from zero. Differences between actual and projected sales tend to be negative and often 
significantly so. 
The lack of significant differences in results across countries can be further illustrated through an 
analysis of variance.  Table 4 reports the results from a regression of the differences between actual and 
projected profits and sales on country category dummies for year t+5.  An intercept has been included 
and the country dummies constrained to sum to zero, so that the coefficient on a country dummy 
represents the difference between its mean and that for the full sample (Suits, 1984). 
 
Table 4. Analysis of variance in year t+5 by country categories 
      
Country/country group  Profits 
Difference in Mn $ 
 
t-value 
Sales 
Difference in Mn $ 
 
t-value 
      
Average   17.8 2.00 -714.0 6.63 
   USA  -0.4 0.33 -16.2 0.70 
   UK   6.3 0.38 168.3 1.13 
   Continental Europe  24.5 0.37 47.6 0.55 
   Japan  -59.4 0.85 -1615.0 1.83 
   Aus/NZ/Can  -51.4 1.32 -91.4 0.45 
   Rest of the world   98.1 1.26 432.5 0.63 
      
Adjusted R²  -0.0006  0.0003  
Number of Observations  1,250  1,250  
Note: "Average" denotes the overall average value of the difference of actual and projected profits or sales. 
All other coefficients are differences from this average. 
 
 
For the full sample, the mean difference between actual and predicted profits in year t+5 is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  No country categorys mean is significantly different from 
that of the full sample.  The mean difference between actual and predicted sales is negative and 
significant at the one percent level.  All country means are insignificantly different from the sample mean 
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except for Japan, whose mean difference in sales is significantly less than the sample mean, although only 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
C. Results by Sector and Type of Merger 
In Panels A and B of Table 5 we have separated mergers into the manufacturing and service 
sectors, and then within these divided them into horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers.  Mergers 
in the manufacturing sector tend to be less profitable than in the service sector.  All 15 entries in the 
service sector are positive, while six of the 15 are negative in the manufacturing sector.  The differences 
between actual and predicted sales are uniformly negative except for vertical mergers in the service 
sector, where two of the differences are positive. 
 
 
Table 5.  Effects of mergers by sector 
 
Panel A. Effects of mergers in the manufacturing sector by category 
 
Years after Number of Profits Sales 
the merger Observations Difference p-value % Positive Difference p-value % Positive 
  in Mn $   in Mn $   
Horizontal mergers         
t+1 411 -8.006 0.370 51.3% -180.323 0.002 47.1% 
t+2 352 3.130 0.761 57.1% -288.936 0.000 44.9% 
t+3 274 15.924 0.252 56.9% -466.510 0.001 48.2% 
t+4 233 41.933 0.007 60.5% -467.476 0.002 46.6% 
t+5 193 41.751 0.017 56.5% -195.891 0.268 43.2% 
Vertical Mergers        
t+1 66 31.234 0.270 55.4% -84.619 0.637 53.0% 
t+2 53 -11.697 0.702 42.6% -42.079 0.897 49.1% 
t+3 47 -52.549 0.112 38.3% -397.957 0.343 46.8% 
t+4 43 -71.252 0.231 43.2% -773.660 0.152 55.8% 
t+5 34 -88.254 0.340 51.4% -989.052 0.188 50.0% 
Conglomerate mergers        
t+1 877 8.133 0.175 55.8% -411.540 0.000 45.5% 
t+2 761 12.253 0.115 54.5% -605.256 0.000 44.3% 
t+3 641 7.833 0.409 52.3% -768.647 0.000 42.0% 
t+4 541 8.567 0.494 52.7% -735.062 0.000 42.6% 
t+5 475 -5.879 0.674 52.4% -824.688 0.000 42.9% 
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Panel B. Effects of mergers in services by category 
 
Years after the merger Number of Profits   Sales   
 Observations Difference p-value % Positive Difference p-value % Positive 
  in Mn. $   in Mn. $   
Horizontal mergers         
t+1 775 12.177 0.017 60.0% -44.617 0.369 61.7% 
t+2 624 14.211 0.093 59.5% -189.847 0.009 59.8% 
t+3 470 5.772 0.627 55.5% -316.710 0.004 52.1% 
t+4 368 22.877 0.088 63.1% -492.849 0.001 50.0% 
t+5 287 39.167 0.038 65.7% -545.498 0.007 52.3% 
Vertical mergers        
t+1 22 23.377 0.248 50.0% -234.462 0.399 45.5% 
t+2 19 9.967 0.543 52.6% -11.693 0.919 42.1% 
t+3 17 38.608 0.031 64.7% 48.534 0.929 41.2% 
t+4 15 11.566 0.781 73.3% -376.665 0.338 50.0% 
t+5 8 104.254 0.013 100.0% 933.507 0.588 50.0% 
Conglomerate mergers        
t+1 550 0.716 0.914 59.8% -178.648 0.016 50.7% 
t+2 465 14.446 0.095 60.6% -406.578 0.001 48.4% 
t+3 374 26.555 0.034 59.1% -584.358 0.000 46.0% 
t+4 309 33.924 0.059 59.9% -735.722 0.000 47.2% 
t+5 247 36.059 0.100 59.5% -1112.637 0.000 40.1% 
Note: The manufacturing sector includes all firms with SIC codes smaller than 4000, the service sector includes those 
firms with SIC code larger than or equal to 4000.  See also the note to table 3. 
 
 
Table 6 presents the results for an analysis of variance conducted in much the same way as in 
Table 4.  Coefficients on the merger categories represent differences from the intercept.  In year t+5, 
horizontal mergers in manufacturing are significantly more profitable than the average merger in 
manufacturing, which had a near zero difference between its actual and projected values (Panel A).  
Vertical mergers in manufacturing are significantly (at the 10% level) less profitable, on the other hand.  
In contrast, all three categories of mergers are equally profitable in the service sector (Panel B).  The 
difference between actual and projected profits for the average merger in the service sector is significantly 
higher than for the average merger in manufacturing.13  
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Table 6 
 
Panel A. Analysis of variance in year t+5 in the manufacturing sector by merger categories 
      
Category  Profits 
Difference in Mn $ 
 
t-value 
Sales 
Difference in Mn $ 
 
t-value 
      
Average  3.1 0.27 -660.0 5.19 
   Horizontal  38.7 2.07 464.1 2.25 
   Vertical  -91.4 1.82 -329.1 0.59 
   Conglomerate  -9.0 1.13 -164.7 1.87 
      
Adjusted R²  0.0066  0.0045  
Number of Observations  702  702  
 
 
Panel B. Analysis of variance in year t+5 in services by merger categories 
      
Category  Profits 
Difference in Mn $ 
 
t-value 
Sales 
Difference in Mn $ 
 
t-value 
      
Average  38.7 2.75 -782.1 4.87 
   Horizontal  0.5 0.03 236.6 1.56 
   Vertical  65.5 0.57 1715.6 1.31 
   Conglomerate  2.6 0.17 -330.5 1.88 
      
Adjusted R²  -0.0031  0.0051  
Number of Observations  542  542  
Note: "Average" denotes the overall average value of the difference of actual and projected profits or sales. 
All other coefficients are differences from this average. See also the note to table 5. 
 
 
Although actual sales fall short of predicted sales in all three categories for the manufacturing 
sector, the shortfall is significantly smaller for horizontal mergers.  Thus, within the manufacturing sector, 
horizontal mergers appear to be considerably more successful than conglomerate and vertical mergers 
with respect to their effect on both profits and sales. 
Within the service sector, vertical mergers exhibit the best performance in terms of sales, 
although the small number of vertical mergers makes the difference statistically insignificant.  Horizontal 
mergers still produce smaller shortfalls between actual and projected sales than do conglomerate mergers. 
Thus, we conclude that mergers in the service sector are generally more successful than those in 
manufacturing, at least as far as their effects on profitability are concerned, and that horizontal mergers 
have more favorable effects on sales than do conglomerate mergers in both sectors, and on profits in 
manufacturing.14 
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Table 7 
 
Effects of domestic and cross-border mergers 
     
Years after Number of Profits Sales 
 the merger Observations Difference p-value % Positive Difference p-value % Positive 
  in Mn. $   in Mn. $   
        
Cross Border mergers       
        
t+1 429 16.136 0.121 58.3% -385.824 0.000 48.1% 
t+2 336 15.727 0.170 58.3% -555.023 0.000 47.3% 
t+3 286 3.886 0.803 53.8% -871.451 0.000 44.9% 
t+4 236 37.202 0.050 66.1% -785.575 0.002 47.0% 
t+5 183 41.826 0.132 62.8% -867.729 0.022 46.2% 
        
Domestic Mergers       
        
t+1 2288 3.986 0.214 56.8% -182.953 0.000 52.1% 
t+2 1940 10.305 0.025 57.0% -353.158 0.000 49.9% 
t+3 1544 12.067 0.046 55.0% -490.591 0.000 46.6% 
t+4 1281 16.454 0.036 56.3% -605.429 0.000 46.1% 
t+5 1064 13.689 0.141 56.7% -687.170 0.000 44.4% 
Note.  See the note to table 3. 
 
D. The Effects of Cross-Border Mergers   
Table 7 breaks the sample into cross-border and domestic mergers.  We have at most 429 
observations on cross-border mergers, and so the results for domestic mergers look a lot like those for the 
full sample.  The same can more or less be said for the cross-border mergers.  Mean differences between 
actual and projected profits are positive in all five post-merger years, but are significantly different from 
zero in only one of them.  Mean differences between actual and projected sales are negative and 
significant in all five post-merger years.  We tested for differences in the effects of cross-border mergers 
that were related to the origin of either the acquiring or target company, but did not find any significant 
differences.  Cross-border acquisitions by (of) UK companies did not generate significantly larger 
changes in sales and profits than was true for other cross-border acquisitions, and the same was true for 
all other countries. 
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IV.  Results: Market Power and Efficiency  
Mergers that increase the efficiency of the merging firms should increase both their profits and 
their sales.  Mergers that increase market power should increase profits and reduce sales.  A merger, 
which reduces efficiency, should reduce both profitability and sales.  In this section we attempt to 
increase our understanding of the causes and effects of mergers, by dividing our sample into subsets of 
mergers that either increase or reduce profitability. 
Panel A1 of Table 8 reports the results for all mergers for which post-merger profitability changes 
are greater than those of the matching industries, while Panel A2 reports the figures for the mergers that 
reduced profitability relative to the control group.  The mean difference between actual and projected 
sales is negative and significant in every post-merger year. The difference between actual and projected 
profits in year t+5 is more than $ 150 million for profitable mergers, a difference of 70.0% (1.70%) 
percent of the actual profits (assets) of the average acquirer in the sample in year t+5. The difference 
between actual and projected sales in t+5 is $ - 475 million,  - 9.6 percent of the sales of the average 
acquirer in  t+5. This is the pattern we expect for mergers that increase market power, and thus we 
conclude that the average profitable merger in our sample would appear to have increased market power. 
Not surprisingly, actual sales for companies undertaking unprofitable mergers (Panel A2) fall 
way below their projected values. We predict that had the acquiring firms not undertaken these mergers 
they would have had 72.3% more profits and 20.8% more sales than they actually had in year t+5.  These 
mergers are unsuccessful in both dimensions and imply that they lowered efficiency. 
In Panel B1 of Table 8 the results are reported for the highest quartile of mergers ranked by the 
difference between actual and projected profits. The average profit changes are roughly three times as 
large as those in Panel A1.  Mean actual sales continue to fall short of their projected values in every year 
after the mergers.  All sales comparisons are highly significant.  In Panel B2 of Table 8 the results are 
reported for the lowest quartile of mergers ranked by changes in profits. These mergers appear as 
unmitigated disasters. 
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Table 8. Tests for Efficiency and Market Power Effects  
     
Panel A1. Mergers with profits changes above zero 
   
Years after Number of Profits Sales  
 the merger Observations 
Difference in 
Mn. $ 
Difference in 
Mn. $ p-value 
     
t+1 1,512 76.129 -92.148 0.013 
t+2 1,276 97.129 -247.630 0.000 
t+3 981 117.517 -328.543 0.000 
t+4 857 140.957 -399.243 0.000 
t+5 706 152.181 -475.338 0.000 
 
Panel A2. Mergers with profits changes below zero 
   
t+1 1192 -83.419 -368.936 0.000 
t+2 998 -99.076 -555.640 0.000 
t+3 846 -113.522 -805.902 0.000 
t+4 660 -139.492 -937.575 0.000 
t+5 544 -157.147 -1023.821 0.000 
 
Panel B1. Mergers with profits changes in top quartile 
   
t+1 661 160.825 -191.652 0.017 
t+2 557 205.372 -554.697 0.000 
t+3 447 240.393 -600.628 0.000 
t+4 368 299.393 -821.384 0.000 
t+5 305 323.198 -817.953 0.004 
 
Panel B2. Mergers with profits changes in lower quartile 
 
t+1 664 -144.851 -666.086 0.000 
t+2 558 -171.933 -903.308 0.000 
t+3 450 -205.304 -1424.606 0.000 
t+4 377 -239.140 -1501.687 0.000 
t+5 308 -269.075 -1631.660 0.000 
 
Panel C. Horizontal mergers with profits changes above zero 
  
t+1 664 70.810 -20.014 0.684 
t+2 558 91.082 -157.492 0.048 
t+3 410 113.251 -249.082 0.030 
t+4 367 125.995 -252.037 0.058 
t+5 294 148.933 -238.859 0.183 
 
Panel D. Vertical mergers with profits changes above zero 
 
t+1 47 132.926 -192.295 0.451 
t+2 33 115.225 174.208 0.641 
t+3 29 84.576 287.980 0.499 
t+4 28 137.429 153.551 0.705 
t+5 25 161.787 710.515 0.240 
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Panel E. Conglomerate mergers with profits changes above zero 
     
t+1 796 77.713 -146.062 0.008 
t+2 680 101.754 -344.146 0.000 
t+3 539 122.894 -424.531 0.000 
t+4 457 153.935 -551.364 0.001 
t+5 384 154.530 -735.240 0.000 
 
Panel F. Horizontal mergers with profits changes below zero 
     
t+1 519 -79.689 -182.776 0.002 
t+2 416 -97.804 -316.613 0.000 
t+3 334 -116.183 -522.617 0.000 
t+4 235 -117.672 -843.660 0.000 
t+5 185 -130.796 -669.969 0.003 
 
Panel G. Vertical mergers with profits changes below zero 
     
t+1 41 -87.076 -41.590 0.770 
t+2 39 -106.117 -210.288 0.504 
t+3 35 -121.891 -749.439 0.140 
t+4 29 -244.293 -1477.246 0.038 
t+5 17 -380.079 -2583.682 0.065 
     
Panel H. Conglomerate mergers with profits changes below zero 
     
t+1 627 -86.521 -544.284 0.000 
t+2 539 -99.820 -763.271 0.000 
t+3 471 -111.278 -1016.108 0.000 
t+4 392 -144.490 -949.741 0.000 
t+5 336 -160.265 -1138.591 0.000 
 
  
Panels C, D and E in Table 8 divide mergers with changes in profitability above the matching 
industries into the horizontal, vertical and conglomerate categories.  The first thing to note is that all three 
categories of successful mergers exhibit roughly similar increases in profitability. The mean differences 
between actual and projected profits tend to get larger as one moves away from the mergers, and fall 
roughly in a range from $ 150 to $160 million in year t+5. 
The mean differences between projected and actual sales for companies undertaking profitable 
horizontal and conglomerate mergers are negative in all five years following the mergers.  Thus, the 
average merger falling in both categories appears to result in an increase in market power.  In contrast the 
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mean difference between projected and actual sales for firms undertaking vertical mergers is negative in 
only year one.  Although none of the other four entries is statistically significant, the results for profitable 
vertical mergers are weakly consistent with their increasing efficiency. 
Panels F, G and H in Table 8 parallel C, D and E for mergers that lowered profitability.  All 15 
post-merger sales comparisons are negative, with all differences for horizontal and conglomerate mergers 
being statistically significant, as were two for vertical mergers.  The average unprofitable merger fits the 
pattern we anticipate for efficiency reducing mergers regardless of what type of merger it is. 
One might expect mergers between small firms to be more likely to increase efficiency by 
creating economies of scale and scope, while mergers between large firms would be more likely to 
increase market power.  These conjectures would lead us to expect sales increases following profitable 
mergers between small companies, and sales decreases following profitable mergers between large 
companies.  Our final test for the effects of mergers splits our sample into small and large acquirers, and 
profitable and unprofitable mergers.15 
The results of these tests are reported in Table 9.  The mean differences between actual and 
projected sales are positive and significant in all five post-merger years for the small firms making 
profitable mergers (Panel A). These differences suggest that profitable mergers of small firms increase 
sales by around $ 150 million or 25.0% relative to the average small acquirer's size in year t+5, while 
profits nearly double. This pattern accords with our prediction for efficiency enhancing mergers and is the 
first time that actual sales have exceeded their projected values on average in each of the five post-merger 
years.  These results strongly suggest that these mergers increased the efficiency of the merging firms. 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Panel A. Mergers with profits changes above zero by size  
     
I. Small Firms     
     
Years after Number of Profits Sales  
 The merger Observations Difference in Mn. $ Difference in Mn. $ p-value 
     
t+1 766 20.440 54.953 0.000 
t+2 642 27.947 72.190 0.000 
t+3 476 36.465 83.328 0.001 
t+4 418 40.155 129.245 0.000 
t+5 349 47.001 148.724 0.002 
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II. Large Firms     
     
t+1 746 133.310 -243.194 0.001 
t+2 634 167.294 -571.486 0.000 
t+3 505 193.925 -716.762 0.000 
t+4 439 236.070 -902.450 0.000 
t+5 357 255.298 -1085.415 0.000 
     
 
Panel B. Mergers with profits changes below zero by size  
     
I. Small Firms     
     
t+1 610 -28.854 -59.829 0.001 
t+2 514 -30.951 -88.808 0.000 
t+3 453 -43.943 -128.520 0.009 
t+4 356 -55.022 -105.590 0.004 
t+5 288 -53.384 -65.567 0.215 
     
II. Large Firms     
     
t+1 582 -140.806 -692.914 0.000 
t+2 484 -171.866 -1051.408 0.000 
t+3 393 -194.135 -1586.702 0.000 
t+4 304 -239.117 -1911.873 0.000 
t+5 256 -274.339 -2101.856 0.000 
Note: The full sample was first divided into "small" and "large" companies using the sales median of acquiring 
firms in year t-1 as the dividing line.  These two samples were then subdivided on the basis of whether profits were 
greater or less than their projected values. 
 
 
In contrast mean differences between actual and projected sales are negative and significant in all 
five post-merger years for the large firms making profitable mergers. These differences suggest that 
profitable mergers of large firms decrease sales by around $ 1 billion or 10.7% relative to the average 
large acquirer's size in year t+5, while the change in profits is 60.7% of the profits of the average large 
acquirer in t+5. These differences accord with our prediction for market power enhancing mergers.  The 
average profitable merger among small firms appears to increase their efficiency, the average profitable 
merger by a large firm appears to increase its market power.  
The results of Panel B of Table 9 are for the firms, which undertook unprofitable mergers.  Here 
we see for both size classes consistent declines in post-merger sales. Unprofitable mergers by both small 
and large companies tend to be the result of reduced economic efficiency. 
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V.  Comparisons with Previous Results in the Literature 
The results reported above with respect to the effects of mergers on profitability and sales are 
broadly consistent with those obtained by others.  In a recent survey of the literature Mueller (1997) 
summarized the results from 20 studies drawn from 10 countries over the post-World War II period that 
generally followed the methodology that we have employed here to determine the effects of mergers on 
profitability, namely compared actual post-merger profits with those predicted using a control group. 
The most ambitious of all of the studies in terms of sample size, time span, and care in handling 
the data was that of Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) for the United States.  They concluded that the 
profitability of acquired firms declined after they were acquired.    On the other hand, Healy et al. (1992) 
found a significant increase in the pre-tax cash flows of the companies involved in the 50 largest mergers 
between 1979 and 1984 implying that the largest mergers in the U.S. during the early 1980s did increase 
either the market power or the efficiency of the merging firms.16  Our results suggest that the profit 
increases that Healy et al. observed were mostly due to increases in market power. 
The largest study of mergers in the UK (Meeks, 1977) concluded as did Ravenscraft and Scherer 
that mergers reduced the profitability of the merging companies.  Other studies for the UK have, however, 
reached the opposite conclusion (Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1980).  Although the preponderance of 
evidence for the UK suggests that mergers tend to reduce profitability (Hughes, 1989), not all studies 
have reached this conclusion. 
No distinct pattern emerges in the studies from other countries.  Profit increases were observed in 
Canada (Baldwin, 1991) and Japan (Ikeda and Doi, 1983), profit decreases in Holland (Peer, 1980) and 
Sweden (Ryden and Edberg, 1980).  In all other countries the differences were statistically insignificant.  
Where mergers seem to result in profit increases in one country (e.g., Germany), they result in declines in 
another (e.g., France).  Thus, our overall finding that the actual post-merger profits of merging companies 
are in many cases insignificantly different from their predicted values is in general accordance with the 
findings of previous studies.  Where we perhaps differ from them is that we have observed a greater 
preponderance of positive and significant profit changes following mergers. 
Our findings with respect to post-merger changes in sales for the surviving firms also accord with 
the main results reported in the literature.  Since we project a merging companys sales using the median 
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sales of a non-merging company in the same industry, one might expect that relative declines in sales will 
translate into declines in market shares.  Three studies of the effects of mergers on market shares exist.  
Goldberg (1973) observed insignificant changes in market shares for a sample of 44 advertising intensive 
firms over an average of 3 1/2 years following their undertaking a merger.  Mueller (1985) observed 
significant declines in market shares for a sample of 209 manufacturing companies over an average of 11 
years following the mergers.  Baldwin and Gorecki (1990) found significant declines in market shares for 
plants acquired in horizontal mergers, but no significant changes for plants acquired in other sorts of 
mergers.  They concluded that their results were consistent with the mergers having increased market 
power.  
Nine studies that measured changes in the growth rates of merging firms following the mergers 
using either their industries or matched non-merging firms as control groups found either that the mergers 
produced no significant change in growth rates [see McDougall and Round (1986) for Australia; Kumps 
and Wtterwulghe (1980) for Belgium; Jenny and Weber (1980) for France; Cable, Palfrey and Runge 
(1980) for Germany; Ryden and Edberg (1980) for Sweden; Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1980) for the 
United Kingdom; and Amel and Rhoades (1989) for acquired U.S. banks], or significant declines [Peer 
(1980) for Holland and Mueller (1980b) for the United States].  Thus, no study of which we are aware has 
found significant increases in either the internal growth rates of merging companies or their market shares 
following their acquisitions, and several have reported significant declines.  Our general finding of 
smaller sales for merging companies than are projected using the sales changes of the median nonmerging 
firm in the merging companies industries is consistent with these results from the literature. 
 
VI.  A Categorization of Mergers According to Their Effects on Market Power and Efficiency  
We begin this paper by stating that mergers can be divided into three broad categories: those that 
increase profits by increasing market power, those that increase profits by increasing efficiency and those 
that reduce profits and efficiency. In Table 1 we categorized these and the other logically possible 
consequence of mergers.  Table 10 summarizes the results of our study by reporting the fractions of 
mergers that fall into each of the four categories. The first entry in each sell gives the percentage of all 
acquisitions by small companies falling into this cell, the second entry is for large acquirers, and the third 
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is for all mergers regardless of size.  Cell 1 reveals that 29.1 percent of the mergers in our sample resulted 
in increases in both sales and profits, and thus met our criterion for efficiency increasing mergers.  A 
larger fraction of mergers by small firms (34.7%) satisfied our criterion for an efficiency-increasing 
merger than was true for large firms (23.4%) (difference significant at the one percent level). 
 
Table 10: Classification of mergers by firm size in year t+5 (Percent of mergers) 
 
 
 
∆Π>0 ∆Π<0 
  1 3 
 Small 34.7 17.5 
∆S >0 Large   23.4*   12.7* 
 All 29.1 15.1 
    
  2 4 
 Small 20.4 27.4 
∆S <0 Large   34.8* 29.1 
 All 27.6 28.2 
    
Notes: ∆Π>0 (∆Π<0) denotes that the mergers resulted in a profit increase (decrease) relative to year t and 
relative to industry and country peers. ∆S>0 (∆S<0) denotes that the mergers resulted in a sales increase 
(decrease) relative to year t and relative to industry and country peers.  The first number in each cell is for 
small firms (total sales less than the median in year t-1), the second number in each cell is for large firms 
(total sales more than the median in year t-1), and the third number in each cell is the overall proportion. A * 
means that the proportion of small firms is significantly different from the proportion of large firms at the 1 
% level, two-sided test. 
 
 
Roughly the same fraction of mergers reduced efficiency (cell 4) as increased it.  Here, however, 
there was no difference related to size.  Small firms were just as likely to undertake a merger that reduced 
both profits and sales as were large firms.  
A slightly smaller fraction of mergers met our criteria for a market power increase than did so for 
an efficiency increase.  As one expects, large firms accounted for a significantly larger fraction of market 
power increasing mergers (34.8%) than did small companies (20.4%).  Thus, some 85 percent of the 
mergers in our sample fall into the three main categories "efficiency increasing", "efficiency reducing" or 
"market power increasing", and they are divided roughly equally across them. 
These comparisons leave out the somewhat puzzling cell 3.  As we noted in Section 1, this pattern 
of effects  sales rise and profits fall  is what one might expect of firms whose managers were size or 
growth maximizers.  It is also what one would expect if the mergers led to a decrease in market power 
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using the same logic that we employ to determine increases in market power.  Even if one uses this logic 
to classify mergers in cell 3 as socially beneficial, however, the fraction of beneficial mergers in our study 
(44.2) falls short of the fraction that is harmful because they either increase market power or reduce 
efficiency.17 
 
VII. Conclusions 
We believe that the present study is the first to determine the effects of mergers on efficiency and 
market power by first separating mergers into those that increase profits and those that reduce them, and 
then examining the patterns of sales changes following the mergers.  Most previous studies have judged 
the consequences of mergers by examining their average effects on either the profits or sales of the 
merging companies.  As the previous section suggests, our results using these tests are broadly consistent 
with what others have found.  We find that 56.7 percent of all mergers result in higher than projected 
profits, but almost the same fraction of mergers results in lower than projected sales after five years.  Both 
mean differences are significantly different from zero.   Thus, using profits as the measure of success 
would lead one to conclude that the average merger was a success, using sales one would reach the 
opposite conclusion.  By basing our judgement of the welfare effects of mergers upon criteria that look at 
both the sales and profits changes following mergers, we have been able to resolve this ambiguity.  We 
predict profit increases and sales declines for mergers that increase market power.  More than a fourth of 
all mergers exhibit this pattern, and this helps to explain why mergers look more successful, when one 
examines post-merger profits than for post-merger sales.  If one categorizes mergers that increase market 
power or that reduce efficiency as welfare reducing, then a majority of the mergers taking place around 
the world over the last 15 years appear to be welfare reducing. 
Our study is the largest cross-national comparison of the effects of mergers to date.  In this 
respect one of our most interesting findings is how similar the post-merger patterns of profit and sales 
changes look across the different countries.  We also did not find significant differences between 
domestic and cross-border mergers.  Although individual mergers can have quite different consequences 
in terms of efficiency and market power, their effects do not appear to depend on the country origins of 
the merging companies. 
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NOTES: 
                                                          
1. We shall not distinguish between mergers and takeovers, but rather simply refer to all as mergers.  
2. Let the industry demand schedule for a homogeneous product be P = 1 - X, where P is price and X is 
total output.  Assume five firms with zero marginal costs.  In a symmetric Cournot equilibrium each 
firms output is 1/6, and industry price is 1/6.  Each firms sales and profits equal 1/36.  If following a 
merger between two firms all firms move to the perfect collusion point on the demand schedule, P = ½ 
= X, and industry profits and sales both equal 1/4.  If the merged company accounts for 1/4th of the 
industrys output, its post-merger profits and sales (1/16) exceed those of the two firms before the 
merger (2/36). 
3.  See, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Mueller (1980a) and Healy et al. (1992). 
4. Choosing as a control group the companies at the first and third quartiles of the size distribution and 
matching by size did not substantially change our findings. Our control group excludes firms that 
made mergers in the period t-1 to t+5, where t is the year of the merger. In the small fraction of cases 
where no control group was available for the respective industry and country or country group, we 
take the median firm in the whole manufacturing/service sector of the respective country/country 
group. 
5. Two biases might occur: If sales data are missing on additional mergers from t to t+5 we underestimate 
projected sales, if sales data are missing on spin- or sell-offs from t to t+5 we overestimate projected 
sales. Additional mergers occur more often than divestitures, while divestitures are larger on average. 
Thus, the two biases potentially offset each other. 
6. Again, two biases occur which potentially offset each other: If the relevant profits data on additional 
mergers undertaken from t to t+5  are missing and taken over profits are positive (which they are on 
average), we underestimate projected profits. If the relevant profits data on divestitures undertaken 
from t to t+5  are missing and spun or sold off profits are positive (which they are on average), we 
overestimate projected profits. 
7. Symmetrically we define a spin- or sell-off as a transaction where more than 50% of the equity are 
disposed off. We use the term "divestitures" interchangeably. 
8. A table summarizing the characteristics of divestitures is available upon request. In short, our database 
covers 9,659 completed divestitures worldwide from 1981 to 1998, 31.4% of these were cross border 
deals, 37.0% horizontal, 4.3% vertical, and 58.7% conglomerate. The average deal value was $ 181 
million. 
9. We could match 6,616 divestitures to these databases aggregated to 4,666 divestiture years. 
10. In Tables 3-9 we drop the left and right one percent of the distribution in each (sub)sample. 
11. Summary statistics on divestitures (available upon request) reveal that divested units are larger and 
less profitable than acquired firms. 
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12. Remember our last year is 1998, thus mergers having taken place in 1993 are the last mergers for 
which we have data until year t+5, mergers having taken place in 1994 are in our sample only up to 
year t+4, mergers of year 1995 up to year t+3 and so on. 
13. Test results are available from the authors upon request. 
14. We also tested for significant differences in the effects of mergers depending on the industry of the 
acquiring companies.   Almost no significant differences were found.  The most interesting exceptions 
were for the chemicals and insurance industries.  Mergers in these industries were followed by profit 
increases significantly above the sample mean, and sales declines below the mean.  The patterns of 
profits and sales changes following mergers in the chemicals and insurance industries strongly 
resemble those that we associate with market power increases. 
15. The full sample was first divided into "small" and "large" companies using the median sales of 
acquiring firms in year t-1 as the dividing line.  These two samples were then subdivided on the basis 
of whether profits were greater or less than their projected values. "Large" firms have average sales 
(profits) of $ 5,713 (264) million and "small" firms have average sales (profits) of $ 341 (18.1) million 
in year t-1. The average deal value of transactions involving "large" acquirers is $ 667 million, while 
the average deal value involving "small" acquirers is  $ 103 million. 
16. Ravenscraft and Scherer also reported that mergers among equals  which is to say between two 
large firms  were more profitable than the average merger in their sample. 
17. Of course, some of the differences between actual and projected profits and sales that we record are 
small and economically insignificant.  Thus, some of the mergers falling into each category might be 
judged to have resulted in small and insignificant increases in market power, etc.  An alternative way 
to proceed would be to define an additional category  no significant difference  where significant 
difference is interpreted as an economically meaningful difference between the actual and projected 
values.  We made such a classification using a one percentage point difference in profits relative to 
assets and a 10 percent difference in sales as our criteria for significant difference.  Using these 
criteria, three percent of the mergers fell into the no difference category for both profits and sales, and 
60 percent of all remaining mergers fell into the three main categories identified in Table 1, with the 
division among them remaining roughly equal  20 percent in each cell.  Thus, ones judgement as to 
the relative proportions of socially beneficial and harmful mergers is not affected by introducing an 
additional, no-difference category. 
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